As an increasingly prevalent class of consumer device, pet wearables hold more privacy implications than might be initially apparent. Through analysis of privacy policies, we show that more data are captured about owners than pets-and which data are captured remains vague.
O ne might be tempted to have assumed that consumers understand the privacy risk stemming from the use of wearables. Research has shown that wearables are a major source of privacy concern for their users, 1 and data leaks are frequently reported in the media. For example, standard (opt-out) tracking functionality enabled on FitBit devices shared into the Strava app was recently confirmed to have led to a leakage of sensitive strategic information. 2 Yet research has also shown that perceived privacy risks have little correlation to consumers' intention to use wearables, let alone their perceived enjoyment of that use. 3 We focus on a potentially insidious threat to our privacy via a new class of seemingly innocuous wearables: the pet wearable. Pet wearables, like other wearables, consist of two distinct data gathering points: the actual wearable worn by the pet and the related software, typically running on the owner's phone and thus allowing for extensive data collection on the owner. Figure 1 visualizes the key relations here. Unlike other wearables, the way pet wearables are marketed to consumers focuses heavily on the pet-related functionality the device provides (e.g., locating a missing pet or tracking walks) while making little mention of whether and to what extent owners will have to give up their personal data as well to use the accompanying software. Knowing that consumers are swayed by the rhetoric and perceived benefits of wearables, with little thought offered toward the potential risks of their use, 4 the way these devices are marketed is an important factor in their adoption and use. If consumers of pet wearables are typically told, with almost exclusive focus, what the wearable will measure of the pet and how this information can be used to improve its well being, it may lull consumers into a false sense of security by understating that they are the actual user of the product and subsequently likely to be tracked as such.
In this article, we show the privacy threats originating from pet wearable use by analyzing the wearables' privacy policies to assess what data they are (not) known to capture. Our key findings include that some pet wearables do not consider the sensitive nature of pet data, are vague in stating exactly what they track, and seemingly track far more data of the owner than the pet and that there is indeed a recurring mismatch between how pet wearables are marketed and what data they are known to track. As a result, consumers need an unreasonable degree of alertness to infer the extent of their personal data that may be unexpectedly and indirectly captured.
Pet Wearables and Privacy Threats
The increasing use of pet wearables makes it important to understand what new privacy threats their use brings. Knowing that humans typically coexist with their pets in a close relationship, it is reasonable to assume that capturing data of a pet will reveal information on the owner. Compare, for example, the notion of tracking a phone. In a TED Talk 5 in 2012, Malte Spitz highlighted the extreme extent to which mobile telecommunications companies log, track, and utilize the metadata that underpin personal device usage. By tracking the user's mobile phone, the service provider was essentially, without consent, tracking Spitz's (and every other user's) life and breaching privacy. It is now widely understood that tracking a mobile phone is tantamount to tracking its user because of the relationship between the user and the phone. The tracking of pet data, similarly, may reveal a detailed picture of pet owners' habits and whereabouts. To complicate matters, an owner, in this sense, may practically be more than a single person. For example, the different family members interacting with their pet, an incidental dog or cat sitter, or even a veterinarian may all be reflected in the pet's data. Exactly whose personal data the pet data may reveal thus becomes an additional concern.
Many pet wearables use accelerometers to capture activity data of pets, which allows for the deduction of complex behavior. Ladha et al. 6 presented a classification system that can deduce 16 advanced canine behaviors and poses, such as shaking, shivering, sniffing, and digging, all of which may be in response to outside stimuli. Mere accelerometer data of a dog thus has the opportunity to be classified into a detailed account of the physical context a dog was in: out for walks at specific times in the morning and evening, playing in the afternoon, or napping at some other times. Such information could be used to build profiles on pet owners, with implications ranging from burglars knowing when to approach a home to insurance companies inferring health profiles of pet owners via their dog's activity. Pet data itself, thus, may contain very sensitive information with the strong potential for privacy intrusions, allowing for consumers' fear "of certain data, when combined, having critical implications." 1 This is all the more concerning because research has argued that many data sets captured by wearables cannot be realistically deidentified or pseudonymized because sensor data are typically unique to individuals as well as rich enough to allow for relatively straightforward reidentification. 7, 8 In an ongoing project, we have recently concluded a study with 81 users of a canine activity tracker (FitBark), eliciting any concerns on the use of the device participants may have had as well as what aspects of these devices were important to them. Among others, we asked users how important they found the device's accuracy, consistency, usability, maintainability, scalability, its look and feel, and its security (explained as its ability for "preventing information leakage about your dog or you"). Security came just before last, with only 53% of users finding it important to some extent, 26% being neutral, and 21% finding it not important. In contrast, most other aspects were considered important by more than 75% of the participants. More telling Figure 1 . The context of a typical pet wearable: the wearable sends pet data to an app, which collects additional owner data and stores both in an undisclosed location. These data are used to generate actionable information for the owner, who then takes actions toward the pet. Pet data may indirectly reflect the pet's immediate surroundings because of its interaction with or reaction to elements in those surroundings (e.g., third parties, being left home alone, or pet boarders). 
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were the results of open questions asking participants to detail any concerns they have had in their use of the device. Myriad concerns were elicited-from the ergonomics of the device to its accuracy or its poor waterproofing. Yet not a single participant expressed any concerns about his or her privacy. This may very well indicate that users are not aware of the potential threats to their privacy, which is in line with what we focus on in this article, i.e., how these devices are marketed as measuring only a pet, not their owner.
What we did come across in this study were examples of pet owners using these devices to derive real-world information of third parties from the pet wearable's data. Some of these examples are rather innocuous, such as a person who used the activity patterns of her dog to show it was sleeping during the times that a neighbor mistakenly (or maliciously) issued noise complaints claiming the dog was barking incessantly. In this case, data are simply used to (in)validate claims about the actual subject of the measurements: the dog.
However, in other cases, users noted interpreting these patterns to infer information about third parties. A different participant described going on business trips regularly and leaving his dog with a dedicated dog sitter, with whom he had an agreement for the exercise goals his dog should achieve while with the sitter. Noting the dog's restlessness on his return, he looked at the recorded activity patterns and saw that the exercise target was not met and, on further analysis, inferred that the dog moved so little and so differently from its regular patterns that it had likely been confined to a cage by the dog sitter. This poses a rather unexpected turn: instead of malicious users compromising a user's privacy via attacks, the user his or herself potentially compromises the privacy of third parties by interpreting changes in patterns of the wearable's data and associating them with hypothesized actions by that third party. Such indirect observation challenges a key requirement for privacy, i.e., people should maintain overall control of their data and their release 9 as well as having to explicitly agree to being tracked. Given these scenarios where pet owners have used a wearable's data to actively infer information about a third party, it is all the more striking that they do not seem concerned with similar privacy threats targeted toward them.
The key privacy threats discussed here are summarized in Figure 2 , mapped onto the context of pet wearables as shown in 
Wearables on the Market
There are many pet wearables available, from official and reseller channels, to seemingly deserted crowdfunder pages. Because no systematic survey or listing of pet wearables is currently available, for purposes of this article, we made a (nonexhaustive) selection of products by searching for website and blog posts discussing popular pet wearable products. We included pet wearables if their website had a product available for purchase or preorder and offered at least a basic description of functionality, technology, and privacy policy. Table 1 presents an overview of the selected products and their core functionalities.
Most pet wearables are described as activity or location trackers, and with the sole exception of TabCat, all devices typically require the owner to install companion mobile apps to fully use the device. The technology used to subsequently exchange data from the wearable device to the owner's mobile phone is of additional interest because there is widespread use of Bluetooth, which is still open to multiple attack vectors for data interception. 9 Bluetooth traffic analysis of common fitness trackers has been shown to allow for observation of current activity and, more critically, a user's gait (i.e., his or her manner of moving), thereby allowing for ID of the observed user. 10 Pet wearables are similarly vulnerable to such analysis, in particular gait analysis, because of the wider breed diversity of dogs, making it more straightforward to correlate different gaits with smaller samples of potential dogs. This is a concrete example of the reidentification challenge of sensor data as mentioned earlier, making it feasible to identify pets (and their owners) even in aggregate data sets. Depending on the extent of additional data linked to pets, this may hold significant privacy implications.
Privacy Policy Analysis of Data Captured by Pet Wearables
For each device, we systematically determined what data its privacy policies note it is capturing of the pet and its owner, detailed in Tables 2 and 3 . We first captured a snapshot of each device's publicly available privacy policy. The analysis was performed by two of the authors, who manually extracted the data mentioned in each policy's section on data collection, resulting in a list of terms. This was then iterated over to reduce trivial synonyms (e.g., the words log in and login being the same). Any terms where it was ambiguous as to what exactly was captured and whether different terms would relate to the same data (e.g., the terms activity data and exercise data) were left separate. We only considered data collected by the service/devices themselves, not any data collected by third parties, such as, e.g., Poof 's ability to link the wearable to a Facebook account, which would result in an increased scope of data collection. The final set of terms describing captured data was then verified against each privacy policy, noting whether the policy explicitly mentioned capturing such data. Interrater reliability was established via Cohen's kappa, with ratings for the classifications of human data κ = 0.93 and pet data κ = 0.95, both indicating very good strength of agreement.
This process was first performed in December 2017 and repeated in June 2018 to assess whether the coming into force of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) prompted any policy updates and, potentially, additional clarification on captured data. Only six devices seem to have had their privacy policy updated since or close before the GDPR came into force. Those with no updated policies typically have a last modified date (if available) between 2015 and 2017. Several policies lacking a last modified date are out of date regardless, stating compliance with now superseded legislation, such as the Data Protection Act 1998, the precursor to the United Kingdom's GDPR implementation.
Even though pets are ostensibly the intended users of these wearables, Table 2 shows there is little explicit information on what (if any) data the products capture. Most pet wearables leave things implicit or use aggregate concepts, such as activity data, rather than specifying exactly what is captured. For example, while it would be obvious to most that a wearable stores a pet's name, only three explicitly denote so. When we switch our attention to what data are captured of owners, more (and certainly more diverse) data are captured. Table 3 shows the extent of the owner's (personal) data that are captured.
Two points require further analysis. First and foremost, what are the implications of the capturing of particular data by each wearable and to what extent (and, perhaps, why) do some pet wearables capture personal data of the owner, such as his or her gender, location, or hobbies and interests? Second, and perhaps more urgent, what are the implications of the lack of explicit mention in privacy policies about whether data are captured? The sheer number of empty cells in both Tables 2 and 3 indicate that consumers will be at a loss for reasonably inferring to what extent their privacy may be at stake.
Discussion: Concerns for the Use of Pet Wearables
Here, we discuss several concerns specific to pet wearables that arise from the previously given findings. This does not imply that these are the only (privacy-related) concerns because well-known general issues are equally as problematic here and may in Figure 2 . The data privacy threats of pet wearables: the ambiguous scope of data collection and (in)direct third-party observation allowed by these products aggravate the common threat of data sharing with third parties. 
Mismatch Between How Products Are Marketed and What Data They Track
There is a mismatch between product marketing and its data collection in two ways: it compares more than one would expect, and it does not detail capturing the key data one would expect to be captured. To describe the first kind of mismatch, we direct attention to devices that are explicitly marketed as being activity or fitness trackers with no location tracking capabilities but, through the use of their necessary related apps, end up tracking their owners' locations regardless. For example, WonderWoof is marketed to consumers stating, among others, "the WonderWoof BowTie does not have GPS and does not track your dog's location in real time. " However, the location of the human user is tracked (see Table 3 ). This is not the only device to do so. PitPat, for example, answers a frequently asked question whether the device tracks dogs' location with, "No, PitPat is an activity monitor (walking, running, sleeping, playing etc) and does not have GPS." Yet, similarly, the accompanying software does track the location of the human user. Knowing that PitPat explicitly claims to have business partners in areas such as "pet insurance; pet food/supplements/pharmaceuticals; veterinary care; retail; academic and other research," the location of dogs and their owners may indeed be valuable data that owners are not aware of being used in such a way.
After GDPR, the capture of location data remains one of the better examples of ambiguity as to whose data are captured. Tractive's privacy policy details that its devices do, indeed, capture location. However, it states only, "GPS position of the user's mobile device (for showing the user position on the map)." But what of the GPS of the pet wearable itself ? Surely this is to be shown on a map as well, e.g., to find a lost pet. No such mention is made, even though a dog will typically be in close proximity to its owner, making tracking the dog's location equally as privacy sensitive as tracking a mobile phone. To further confuse matters, the policy does note that the purpose of its data processing includes "track[ing] your pet's location"-without detailing that the device actually captures the data to do so.
A rare positive example can be found in Kyon's policy, which seems to understand and warn users of the potentially sensitive nature of pet location data: "the location of your KYON tracking collar and base station, geo-fence information which may disclose the location of your residence or other locations personal to you."
The second kind of mismatch is a lack of clarity as to whether expected data are captured or not. Tables 2  and 3 show those devices marketed as either both activity and location trackers or one or the other that do not explicate what or the extent of which such data are captured. This makes it difficult to verify the extent of data collected and what information may be deduced from those data. For example, PawTrack is marketed as "the world's most advanced cat tracking system," boasting incorporating Galileo, GLONASS, and GPS, making it possible to track a cat whereever it is. Yet, regardless of all of the sensors the device contains and the potential data collection it performs, the privacy policy makes no mention of location. As a result, it is not possible to establish whether location data are captured constantly, intermittently, and so on. One key finding is that looking at a pet wearable's functionality is not enough for a user to feasibly assess the kinds and extent of data it captures. 
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NOTE: A √ or † indicates the policy explicitly mentions capturing these data, noted in the first and second analysis, respectively. Empty cells indicate the policy does not explicitly mention capturing these data. A question mark indicates an important mismatch, lacking detail on activity or location data in devices with such functionality. Devices highlighted in yellow are not clearly covered by a post-GDPR privacy policy. Cells that are empty or have a question mark are informationalwhile data are not known to be captured, in many cases they likely are, such as a pet's name, breed, and weight, all of which may constitute (sets of) personally identifying information. Their lack of explicit mention in policies thus becomes important to note, as such data are likely not addressed under requirements for personal data processing (e.g., encrypted storage, limitation of transfer).
Differences in Whether Pet Data Are Classified as Personal Data
Some devices implicitly acknowledge the sensitive nature of data collected from pets by mentioning them as collected personal data. For example, FitBark notes that personal information includes, "your dog's profile and activity information." Some devices remain vague on the matter, especially when they do not list any data captured, as will be discussed later. However, one wearable stands out from its contrasting position. The privacy policy of PetPace explicitly states, "Pets' data [are] non-identifiable nor shall be considered as personal information." As argued before, because pet wearables collect and process owner and pet data, there is very little reason to assume the pet data do not have a relation to an identifiable natural person.
Unclear Extent of What Pet Data Are Stored (and Inferred)
In line with findings that privacy policies are rife with vague and unclear language, 11 we encountered two types of concerns where consumers cannot be sure of the extent of data collected by the wearable. First, several devices do not state at all what pet data are collected, such as the Garmin DeltaSmart, Kippy, Nuzzle, PawTrack, Poof, Scollar, and TabCat. This is a concern because we cannot infer whether pet data that are collected by the device are considered as personal data or not. For example, the Garmin privacy policy states that personal information is "information that, either alone or in combination with other information collected, identifies an individual." This would reasonably include most, if not all, pet data. Yet, as also shown previously, not all device manufacturers would agree with this interpretation, making it impossible to determine to what extent pet data are suitably protected.
Second, several devices describe what data are collected in terms of combined or aggregate concepts. For example, FitBark, Jagger & Lewis, Kyon, Paby, PetPace, and WUF all use concepts, such as pet profile or activity data, to describe what pet data are gathered, rather than detailing this to exact data. This is of concern because one cannot infer the degree to which the pet data collected are critical.
This has not abated in the policies updated since the advent of the GDPR, from FitBark adding that it captures "your dog's health and behavioral information," without detailing what that information is, to the updated policy for TractiveGPS and TractiveMOTION referring to the notion of pet-related data, which is only defined as, "allows to draw conclusions about the pet owner (e.g., pet chip ID)." This lack of transparency gives little information as to exactly what pet information is captured and to what extent it may identify the pet's owner. This makes it difficult for owners to assess whether they
The Extent of Personal Data Captured by Pet Wearables Is Seemingly Misrepresented
When a device is marketed as solely an activity tracker and makes several mentions (e.g., in product descriptions and official FAQs) that it does not include GPS and does not track the pet's location, it is absolutely reasonable for consumers not actually wearing the device to infer that normal use of the wearable would not track their or their pet's locations. However, as shown in Table 3 , this is not always the case. This holds true not only for location but also other sensitive personal data, where it is not reasonable for the consumer to assume such information would be tracked and stored.
Compare this to the scenario discussed previously of unintentional data leakage via FitBit and Strava. In that case, military personnel tracked their exercise routes and data and knowingly uploaded these to a third-party service that specifically mentioned using any such data. In such cases, it can be argued that users could reasonably have 
understood the privacy risk, given the known sensitivity of the data. However, what of the scenarios discussed here? Why would someone expect his or her location to also be tracked if uploading pet data of a device noted not to have GPS nor to track the pet's location? Moreover, one cannot feasibly infer whether data are sensitive if aggregates, such as activity data or pet profiles, are used, all of which may, for example, include (indirect) location estimates.
Better protection of consumers is needed by ensuring that devices whose key data capturing subject is a person do not market themselves as targeting an entirely different entity: the pet.
Consumers and Third Parties Are Potentially at Risk Because Pet Data Are Not Classified as Personal Data
If companies explicitly classify collected pet data as not personally identifiable and, therefore, not protected under relevant data protection clauses, such data are at risk. Several devices avoid mentioning pet data as personal data or use aggregate concepts that make it difficult to assess exactly what data are protected. This poses a risk toward users of pet wearables due to the potential of inferring sensitive data of the human from the pet's data.
Such risks are known and well-studied, such as the tracking of mobile phones now being equated with tracking their owners. Research has shown other contexts in which personal data could be inferred from seemingly nonpersonal data, such as deriving the specific train route someone travels from patterns in their phone's vibration energy harvesting system. 4 Because the human-animal companionship between owners and their pets is well known, any pet data should be carefully assessed for the potential to indirectly reveal identity or other information about the related human.
The examples given in the section "Pet Wearables and Privacy Threats" make it clear that even if there are no well-known cases of an owner's privacy being violated by pet data, owners themselves already use these data to infer information about third parties from the data captured from their pets. This raises further discussions on how to interpret such data (and how to agree on such interpretations), as in the absence of certification schemes for accuracy of wearables, inaccurate data may lead one to misjudge a third-party's behavior. In the earlier dog sitter scenario, what would happen if the wearable's classification algorithms were not optimal and misclassified the dog's behavior-leading the owner to accuse a third party of malicious behavior with false but hard to repudiate proof?
Moreover, an increasing number of pet wearable manufacturers are entering into collaborations with larger corporations. For example, Whistle was recently incorporated into the Mars Petcare veterinary health group, which includes a significant number of third parties in pet nutrition, health care, and insurance. Vodafone recently incorporated Kippy into the V by Vodafone range of services, which tracks consumers' pets, children, cars, and other possessions. While such integration is ostensibly for direct consumer functionality and wider social benefit (e.g., improving pet health care), a result is that large data sets incorporating data of pet wearables may become available to a wide range of third parties. This shows the need to explicitly protect pet data as personal data, both to protect people from having their personal data compromised by malicious attackers as well as those same people unintentionally opening themselves up to liability by unknowingly compromising the privacy of others by deriving personal data on them through their pet's data.
T his article has shown that pet wearables on the market engage in extensive data collection of their human owners, typically capturing far more data of the owner via the accompanying software than of the pet itself and tend to be vague on the extent of pet data collected, all of which may be sensitive and lead to the ID of people the pet has interacted with. We argue that consumers are led into underestimating the extent of personal data collected and that they may be at risk due to the denial of pet data's status as personal data.
With the increase of strict data privacy laws being passed around the world and the now active enforcement of the GDPR, which is applicable to any company processing data of European Union citizens, it seems particularly timely to stimulate a discussion on what extent of pet wearable data are personal data and how they should be suitably protected. Comparing our findings with the GDPR's key principles for personal data processing, we found the following: Implementing privacy controls could mitigate some of these concerns by giving consumers clearer insight into what data are captured and allowing them to opt out of nonvital data capture (i.e., much of the data in Table 3 ). More complicated, however, is the matter of stored pet data reflecting personal data not only of its owner but of other people with whom the pet interacts. Privacy controls, through nudging, 12 could be a solution for third parties knowingly interacting with the pet, such as a family member while pet sitting. A third-party individual could install the wearable's app and be given temporary access to privacy controls by the pet owner while in the vicinity of the pet, so that while pet sitting, he or she would maintain control over the extent of data captured.
However, third parties who do not knowingly interact with the pet could not feasibly do so. To protect their right to privacy, a combination of policy and responsible use, informing the owner via nudges, seems a more viable solution. For example, nudges could describe the potential consequences that the processing of these data may have: "you're in public now: your dog's activity data may disclose information on others it interacts with!" Rather than relegate such warnings to privacy policies that go unread by most consumers, using nudges when using relevant functionality would go a long way in ensuring consumers realize the potential impact of using these wearables.
As manufacturers of pet wearables on the market differ in their views toward pet data, from acknowledging their sensitive nature and ability to identify people to outright denying it (with most manufacturers seemingly avoiding an explicit stance on the debate), we call for explicit discussion and policy toward the secure treatment of pet data. We need more insights to understand what pet data (or combinations thereof) can be considered personal data, when and how these data can be shared or transferred to new or other owners, and how we can protect the impact such data have on both pet owners and third parties whose behaviors and actions may be indirectly reflected in such data.
